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'HOLEHUDWLRQ6FKPHOLEHUDWLRQ(QRFK¶V,QGLVSHQVLELOLW\
Argument 
 
James Lenman 
 
This is my version of a paper published in Philosophical Studies 168, 2014, pp. 835-
842. DOI 10.1007/s11098-013-0214-7. Please refer to the final published version 
when quoting or citing  
 
When you are going on holiday to the South Pole, you ought to pack your 
winter woollies. When you are going to see Aunt Agatha on her birthday, you might 
very sensibly take her some of those nice chocolates she likes. When you are visiting 
the lions at the safari park, it is a bad idea to get out of the car. Normative facts such 
as these do not strike me as very puzzling or mysterious or as offering very significant 
hostages to metaphysical fortune. Nothing, it might seem, could be more homely and 
straightforward. More extended stretches of practical reasoning appear similarly plain 
sailing. Tomorrow is Christmas Day and I am driving north to my family in Scotland. 
Because Scotland is far away I will want to stop and eat something. But because, in 
the UK, where I live, Christmas Day is a major holiday, nowhere will be open except 
a few petrol stations, and because the food you can buy in petrol stations is not very 
nice, it would make sense to prepare something in advance and take it with me. I have 
bread and there is chicken in the fridge that needs using up ± it will go off before I get 
back. I am not a vegetarian. I like chicken. So I should make myself some chicken 
sandwiches. This is the sort of thing we call deliberation and of course we do it all the 
time.  
'DYLG(QRFK¶VTaking Morality Seriously1 is an admirably lucid and spirited 
defence of robust realism about the normative domain, the domain of reasons and 
values2 that guide and inform such thinking. The robustness distinguishes his realism 
from more metaphysically unassuming forms of normative realism. It holds normative 
truths to be irreducible to natural ones and views them as strongly mind-independent. 
Of course they might nonetheless be mind-dependent in the sense that their truth-
conditions may be as psychological as you please: it would be consistent with robust 
mind-independence that the only things noninstrumentally worth pursuing are states 
of desirable consciousness. The kind of mind-independence Enoch insists on is a 
matter of the facts about our consciousness, or what we, or anyone, wants or believes 
or any other psychological facts not determining that what these truth conditions are. 
$V(QRFKSXWVLW³QRUPDWLYHWUXWKVGRQRWconstitutively depend on our responses or 
attitudeVRUGHVLUHV´S 
If the view of the normative Enoch defends here is right, this deliberation is a 
much stranger and less straightforward business than I have hitherto thought. It is, we 
naturally suppose, a process guided by reasons but being guided by reasons is not like 
being guided by footpaths or signposts or the sat nav system in your car. For these 
reasons, or more properly their status as such, let us say, the normative truths to the 
effect that they are reasons (see pp. 220-221), are wholly invisible, not just to sight 
but to any of the sensory modalities by which the natural world impinges on our 
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 Oxford, OUP, 2011. PaJHUHIHUHQFHVDUHWR(QRFK¶VERRN unless otherwise indicated.  
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 (QRFKXVHVWKHWHUPµQRUPDWLYH¶OLEHUDOO\DQGGRHVQ¶WVKDUSO\GLVWLQJXLVKEHWZHHQWKHQRUPDWLYHDQG
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cognitive capacities. Rather the guidance in question is fabulously indirect. We are 
guided in our deliberation by our normative beliefs. And our normative beliefs are 
shaped by the psychological dispositions the blind processes of our evolutionary 
development have landed us with, tidied up a bit by the efforts of our critical 
intelligence to bring them, or the judgements that express them, into reflective 
equilibrium (p. 166). But nonetheless there is some correlation between the resulting 
EHOLHIVDQGWKHQRUPDWLYHWUXWKVEHFDXVHWKHPHWDSKRULFDO³DLP´RIHYROXWLRQURXJKly 
the aim implicit in the quasi-teleological understanding we bring to bear on living 
things and processes when we adopt the design stance in evolutionary explanation, 
something like survival perhaps, or perhaps some thing or some bunch of things 
UHOLDEO\FRQGXFLYHWRWKDW³DLP´SKDSSHQVWREHJRRG+HUHWKHSKUase 
³KDSSHQVWR EH´LVDSSRVLWH(YROXWLRQGRHVQ¶WKDYHWKH³DLP´LWGRHVEHFDXVHWKDWDLP
LVJRRGWKHFDXVDOLQHUWQHVVRIWKHQRUPDWLYHUXOHVWKDWRXW,W¶VMXVWDKDSS\FRVPLF
coincidence, a miracle, as Enoch concedes (p. 172-173). It is a little puzzling too how 
we cRXOGHYHUNQRZWKH³DLP´RIHYROXWLRQRUVRPHWKLQJRUWKLQJs intimately 
connected with it, was good. Here Enoch appeals to the fact that this supposition is 
UHDOO\H[WUHPHO\SODXVLEOH³KDUGWRGHQ\´DVKHSXWVLW%XWWKLVORRNVOLNHDVLPSOH
appeal to normative intuition which, coming at a point in the argument where the 
credibility of such intuition is at issue, is surely profoundly question-begging. Of 
course, after all, we find this hard to deny. Given the way we have evolved, to echo 
Mandy Rice-DaviHVZHZRXOGZRXOGQ¶WZH"The upshot of all this is what Enoch 
FDOOV³D*RGOHVVSUH-HVWDEOLVKHGKDUPRQ\H[SODQDWLRQ´(p. 168) of how it might 
come about that our normative beliefs might have at least some tendency to line up, 
more or less, with the normative truths.  
7KLVVWRU\VWULNHVPHDVVWDUNO\LQFUHGLEOH,GRQ¶WWKLQN,QHHGWREHOLHYHLWLQ
order to make sense of what I am doing when I figure out that it would be a good idea 
to make sandwiches before a long road trip. But maybe I do. Maybe this is the best 
account of normative epistemology the robust normative realist can have and so, if 
there are compelling grounds to believe robust normative realism, we need to believe 
it. Enoch thinks there are such grounds. And the centrepiece of his case for this 
contention is the argument in chapter 3 that normative truths of the kind he favours 
are indispensable for deliberation. So let us turn to that. 
Enoch thinks normative truths are deliberatively indispensable.3 Rather more 
precisely he thinks a commitment to such truths is instrumentally indispensible to 
deliberation in such a way that we could make no sense of deliberation succeeding if 
there were no such truths, and he thinks deliberation itself intrinsically indispensible  
in that abstaining from deliberation is not an option for us. His argument for this, as 
he notes, has a delicate course to navigate: 
 
:KDWZHQHHG«LVDQDFFRXQWRIGHOLEHUDWLRQWKDWVDWLVILHVWZRGHVLGHUDWD)LUVW
GHOLEHUDWLRQ«PXVWSODXVLEO\EHFRQVLGHUHGDUDWLRQDOO\QRQ-optional project. 
And, second, irreducibly normative truth must be indispensable for deliberation. 
Unfortunately, though, these desiderata seem to pull in opposite directions. The 
WKLFNHURQH¶VDFFRXQWRIGHOLEHUDWLRQ± the more one is willing to build into it as 
necessary conditions ± the more plausible it is that irreducibly normative truths 
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 He notes (p. 75, note 60) that the thought is not novel, having been anticipated in various ways by 
Nagel, Bond, Darwall, Kolnai, Pettit and Smith. The list might be extended by mentioning Taylor 
1989, chapter 3 and Lieberman 1998 where similar moves are made. My argument against Enoch here 
is largely by way of elaboration of an argument made rather breathlessly in a short review of the latter. 
(Lenman 2000). 
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are indispensable for deliberation, but the less plausible it is that opting out of 
the (thickly understood) deliberative project is not a rationally acceptable 
option; the WKLQQHURQH¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIGHOLEHUDWLRQWKHPRUHSODXVLEOHLWLV
that deliberation is rationally non-optional, but the less plausible it is that 
deliberation requires irreducibly normative truths. The challenge is to steer a 
middle course. (pp. 71-2) 
 
This passage show that Enoch has neatly anticipated my central objection to his 
argument. For I will argue that, for all that he is self-forewarned of this challenge, 
his attempt to meet it flounders. The most that is really intrinsically indispensible is 
a decidedly thin sort of deliberation for which irreducibly normative truths are not 
indispensible at all. Or so I shall argue.  
 When I GHOLEHUDWHDERXWVRPHWKLQJLQ(QRFK¶VRZQFHQWUal example, when 
I deliberate about whether to embark on a career in law or in philosophy, I am 
posing questions to myself in a way that presupposes that there better and worse 
ways of answering them. The deliberative enterprise, the attempt to answer these 
TXHVWLRQVZHOO³GRHVQ¶WIHHOOLNHMXVWWU\LQJWRPDNHDQDUELWUDU\choice. That is 
just what it is not like to deliberate. Rather it feels like trying to make the right 
FKRLFH´S'HOLEHUDWLRQLVOLNHFKRRVLQJQRWSLFNLQJ8QOLNHSLFNLQJLWLV³DQ
attempt to eliminate arbitariness by discovering (normative) reasons´SDQG
presupposes that there are such reasons to be discovered. Phenomenologically, it 
feels like engaging with a factual question where there is a right answer for us to 
find, one constituted prior to our deliberation. In deliberating we commit ourselves 
to the reality of the normative reasons without which our deliberating would make 
no sense, without which there could be nothing to count as it succeeding. (p. 78) 
 Of course deliberation is not arbitrary. It is something that can be done well 
or dRQHEDGO\(QRFK¶VRZQH[DPSOHRIGHOLEHUDWLQJDERXWRQH¶VFDUHHUshows this 
well enough. Here it is not so obvious there are definitely right and wrong answers4 
but there are certainly good ones and stupid ones. In choosing a career I want to 
choose a profession for which there is enough demand that I will have a reasonable 
hope of making a living at it, preferably a good living that will keep my and any 
dependants in comfort and security. I want something that is a good match with my 
talents, a line of work I will find tough enough, given my abilities, to challenge me, 
if I am not to be bored, but not so tough I find myself out of my depth and the 
stress drives me to drink. I very likely want it to be something I enjoy, something I 
feel is socially worthwhile. This is not at all like picking. It is an enterprise such 
that, if I do it well, I am more likely to find myself happy, happy with the self-
respect consequent on supporting myself and others by making some useful 
contribution to the world or at least my little corner of it, happy when at work to be 
doing something useful that I enjoy, happy when not at work that I can enjoy my 
leisure in some comfort. If I do it badly I am more likely to find myself, miserable, 
depressed, impoverished, unemployed.  
But none of this looks very arbitrary. None of this looks to me like the 
absence of robust normative truths will leave it arbitrary. Modest normative truths 
will do fine. Give me modest normative truths and I will give you standards to 
evaluate deliberation in nonarbitrary ways. Other things equal, those of us who 
deliberate well flourish and prosper, those who do so badly do not, those who do so 
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 7KLQNHJRI-DPHV*ULIILQ¶VFODVVLFGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHFRPSHWLQJFDOOVRIVFKRODUVKLSDQG
mountaineering  in his 1986, pp. 109ff.  
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well succeed in their projects and enterprises, those who do so badly do not. The 
bad practical reasoner is stuck in a job she hates, and forcing herself to eat some 
filthy mass-SURGXFHGSDVW\UHKHDWHGLQWKHSHWUROVWDWLRQ¶VPLFRURZDYH,RQWKH
other hand have this quite nice job and these lovely chicken sandwiches stashed in 
my car. 
But, an impatient reader may protest, that just moves the problem further 
back. That I would be unhappy in the Royal Marines is a reason not to pursue a 
career there only if it matters that I not be unhappy. And of course that matters: 
whoever would want to be unhappy? But now perhaps we have found modest 
normativity out. It answers to standards set by our desires and what is normative 
about them? There would to be some more robust normative truths underwriting 
these desires, perhaps a normative truth to the effect that we should aim to satisfy 
our desires. Or a landscape of normative truths that our particular desires somehow 
UHIOHFW2WKHUZLVHLWLVDOOVWLOODUELWUDU\³:HQHHGQRUPDWLYHWUXWKVHYHQLIYLHZHG
from a third-person perspective, our desires suffice in order to cause our actions 
and then explain them, because, when deliberating we know our desires are merely 
our desires.´S  
Trouble is we have arbitrariness and arbitrariness. This talk of arbitrariness 
brings to mind 4XLQQ¶s famous Radio Man5 acting on some brute, inferentially 
isolated impulse to activate a radio. That is indeed decidedly rationally arbitrary. 
$QGKHUHLV$OEHUWWXUQLQJWKHUDGLRRQLQRUGHUWROLVWHQWR%DFK¶VMass in B-
Minor+HGRHVWKLVEHFDXVHKHORYHV%DFK¶V0DVVDQGNQRZVKHZLOOreally enjoy 
listening to it. He is free of other commitments for the next hour or so, free of 
competing immediate claims on his time from project or people close to him. He 
knows he will enjoy listening to the Bach and also considers this enjoyment 
worthwhile, because it is a sort of rich aesthetic enjoyment of beautiful works of 
art that has a central place in the sort of life Albert most values. While Radio Man 
has one desire, Albert has thousands, ranging from brute appetites to rich and 
complex ideas expressing the kind of man he wants to be and the kind of live he 
wants to live. His desires are not arbitrary but are each subject to critical scrutiny 
in the light of the complex landscape of ends set by the others. Moving through 
this landscape he seeks to deliberate in ways whose outcomes will cohere with his 
reflectively stable aspirations for the sort of life he wants to make for himself and 
the sort of world he wants to cooperate with others in shaping. This is not 
arbitrary.6  
Oh yes it is, someone might reply. Ultimately it is. A given choice may 
enjoy a certain local non-arbitrariness given the space of aims that shape it. But the 
whole landscapeWKHWRWDOLW\RI$OEHUW¶VFRQFHUQVGHVLUHVDQGDLPVWDNHQDVD
whole, that is just arbitrary. And even if we urged that this is not quite so because 
no man is an island and it is on the shared concerns, desires and aims of larger 
normative communities, our aims and not just mine, that we should focus here, the 
objection will return that that, taken as a whole is still ultimately brutely 
contingent, ultimately just grounded in the attitudes we happen to find ourselves 
with (cf. p.80). 
:HOO2.EXWKHUH¶VWKHWKLQJ&RQVLGHUWKHVRUWRISUDFWLFDOWKLQNLQJ
where we try to do well with respect to standards of evaluation set by all those 
deeply entrenched concerns and aspirations we humans happen to have, aspirations 
                                                 
5
 Quinn 1993, p 236ff.  
6
 Cf. my 2005, pp. 40-41, 2009a, pp. 6-7, 2009b, pp. 196-198, 2010, pp 186-187. 
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for pleasure, flourishing, love, prosperity, peace, justice, security, country air and 
all that other stuff we happen to like but remain cheerfully indifferent to normative 
truths as Enoch conceives them/HW¶VFDOOPHQWDODFWLYLW\RIWKLVVRUW 
schmeliberation. And, for now at least, call the stuff Enoch thinks he goes in for 
deliberation. Now notice, first that, whetever else is true of schmeliberation, there 
is certainly something to count as its succeeding. That something is a standard, or, 
better perhaps, a contextually variable set of standards set by our aims in all their 
ultimate contingency. But a standard is a standard and a standard is all we need. 
Secondly, I think  I can now very plausibly claim this about schmeliberation. The 
difference between deliberation and schmeliberation is not remotely like the 
difference invoked by Enoch between picking and choosing. And one crucial and 
conspicuous way in which the former difference differs from the latter is that it is 
highly phenomenologically unobtrustive. Picking a pack of Kelloggs Mini-Wheats 
out of the dozens on the supermarket shelf feels like trying to make an arbitrary 
FKRLFHLWGRHVQ¶WIHHOOLNHWU\LQJWo get anything right. So it is easy to see that, 
when we deliberate, this is not what we are doing. But schmeliberating does not 
feel like picking either,WGRHVQ¶WIHHODUELWUDU\DWDOO,WIHHOVOLNHVRPHWKLQJ,FDQ
do well, when the life that results from it is a happy life that will bear my survey7, 
and like something I can screw up at as many of  those who are miserable, 
depressed, impoverished, unemployed, with no nice chicken sarnies to eat can 
sadly attest.8 Schmeliberating, I contend, feels just like how deliberating feels. So, 
LQVRIDUDV(QRFK¶VDUJXPHQWUHVWVRQDQDSSHDOWRWKHSKHQRPHQRORJ\RI
GHOLEHUDWLRQLWGRHVQ¶WDPRXQWWRPXFK 
Yes but it is all still ³mere´ desire. Where does the normativity get in 
XQOHVVZHDOVR³FRPPLWRXUVHOYHVWRWKe judgement that our desire made the 
UHOHYDQWDFWLRQWKHRQHLWPDGHPRVWVHQVHWRSHUIRUP´S97KLV³YHU\
.DQWLDQ´WKRXJKWSLVDIDPLOLDUREMHFWLRQWRDOOURXJKO\+XPHDQWDNHVRQ
practical reason10 and there are many rich and resourceful Humean responses to it 
in the literature.11 Enoch does not review all the relevant arguments and nor will I. 
Briefly, on my own view there is no real mystery.12 On my own view a space of 
reasons is just is a space of desires. But not ± and this is where naturalistic views 
fall down ±  as viewed from a third person perspective. A space of reasons is a 
VSDFHRIGHVLUHVDVDVSDFHRIGHVLUHVSUHVHQWVLWVHOIZKHQWKRVHGHVLUHVDUHRQH¶V
own. What reason talk expresses are the passions in our souls, ordered and shaped 
by critical intelligence.13 Our talk of normativity just expresses the force that 
attaches to motivation we feel from unalienated desires, desires with which we 
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 Hume, 1740, book III, part III, section 6, paragraph 6, Tiberius, 2002, 2008, Lenman 2009b. 
8
 Of course the links between good deliberation and prospering are always loose, probabilistic and 
hemmed in with ceteris paribus clauses. I would hate for any reader to attribute to me any obnoxious, 
ignorant and simplistic suppositions about the deliberative superiority of us relatively comfortable folk 
to others less well circumstanced.  
9
 Pronouns changed from 3rd sing. to 1st plural for syntactical consistency 
10
 Influential versions can be found in Hampton 1998, Korsgaard 2008.. 
11
 Tiberius 2000 and Hubin 2001 are just two fine papers chosen (not merely picked) from a large 
literature. See also my 1999. 7KHWHUP³+XPHDQ´JHWVDSSOLHGERWKWRH[SUHVVLYLVWPHWDHWKLFDO
theories and to various forms of descriptive naturalism. As will be apparent my own sympathies are 
with the former but the writings of adherents to the latter are also often rich in resources with which to 
combat less metaphysically unassuming forms of realism.) 
12
 Cf. Lenman 1999, 2007,, 2009a, 2009b, 2010. 
13
 It might be objected that there would be little for critical intelligence to do unless we were to 
attribute some more or less robust sort of normativity at least to  epistemic reason. In particular Cuneo 
2007 might inspire such a concern. In Lenman 2008  I sketch a response.  
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stably reflectively identify. This need not commit us to accept a normative 
judgement to the effect that it is our desires that make the relevant action the one it 
makes most sense to perform. To suppose that would be to make my normative 
thought, in implausible ways, all about me14, and it is not. My normative thought is 
about whatever my desires are about and many of them are not about me at all. Of 
course there is a level of metaethical explanation at which we may recognize that it 
is just me or, better perhaps, just us.15 But so long as we, and in particular our 
evaluative sensibilities, do not become hateful to ourselves, I guess we can live 
with that.  
'HOLEHUDWLRQ(QRFKFODLPVLVLQWULQVLFDOO\LQGLVSHQVLEOH,¶PKDSS\WR
concede that something like this is true. Of course we could give up deliberating. 
%XWZHFRXOGQ¶WJLYHXSGHOLEHUDWLQJWKHZD\ we might give up playing golf or 
smoking cigarettes. To give up deliberating would be to give up living (and that of 
course is always an option). But, and again the point is crucial the sense in which it 
is true that deliberation in intrinsically indispensible is one where deliberation need 
be no more than ³PHUH´schmeliberation. 
Here is a fine young fellow, call him Enoch, who believes this wild story 
about a robustly real domain of normative truths. When he deliberates he thinks he 
is guided, if not quite by these truths, for they areOHW¶VIDFHLW too remote from us 
to guide anything, but at least by beliefs about them, beliefs he trusts a (Godless) 
pre-established harmony is disposing to be something better than complete 
baloney. But now imagine something remarkable happens. Reading the critical 
studies I and my colleagues have contributed to this excellent symposium, our 
imaginary Enoch changes his mind. So now what he will do? Where is he left 
without his previous beliefs. Is he perhaps just to stop deliberating? Hardly. 
Conceivably ± but not very probably ± a sense of finding himself of a world 
suddenly stripped of normative significance might drive him to paralysing despair; 
EXWOLNHWKHWURXEOHG\RXWKGHVFULEHGE\+DUHLQ³1RWKLQJ0DWWHUV´16, he would 
probably not remain long in that unhappy state. Of course he would no longer 
believe in a robustly real domain of normative facts that happened to match up 
with the things evolutionary and other forces had shaped him to care about. But he 
would nonetheless still care, and in some cases care a great deal, about the things 
evolutionary and other forces had shaped him to care about. He may no longer take 
himself to inhabit a world populated by robustly real normative truths but he 
remains an intelligent creature with passions in his soul. Notwithstanding the loss 
of his belief in robustly real normative truths, he still cares about his own 
prosperity and happiness, about the wellbeing of his family and friends and the 
continued flourishing of his relationships with them, about the success of his 
various projects (finishing that book, building that outhouse), about living a whole 
life that will bear his survey in the light of such ideals of the person as he stably 
reflectively endorses (all this of course jusWDORDGPRUH³PHUH´GHVLUHVHe still 
cares about the small things (which are often not so small): still likes relaxing over 
a good detective story, perhaps, or enjoying a few beers after an energetic country 
walk. And he still cares about the big things, about justice and peace, kindness and 
courtesy, still feels motivated to participate in the various conversations that may 
                                                 
14
 Blackburn especially is eloquent on this point. See his 1984, p. 217-220, 1998, pp. 250-256. Cf 
Lenman 2010.  
15
 Nagel 1997.  Cf. Lenman 2010, p. 193. On the nuanced character of quasi-realist mind-independence 
Gibbard 2011 is particularly illuminating.  
16
 Hare 1972.  Many will observe that this little narrative also has an obvious debt to Blackburn 1993.  
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occur in his political community about how best to serve these and other values. 
Given a sufficiency of critical intelligence and self-command, he can still 
schmeliberate ± or, as we Humeans prefer just to call it, deliberate -  about how to 
live out each day in ways that will partake of all these good things (for that is what 
we Humeans think they are). All he will miss out on is any prospect of his response 
to the reasons (for that is what we Humeans think they are) that thereby engage 
him enjoying the invisible ratification of an inscrutable domain of putative 
³QRUPDWLYHWUXWKV´17. But I struggle to understand why anybody would care about 
that.  
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